CCL: A global convention or an international joke?

 Sent to CCL by: Sengen Sun [sengensun~~yahoo.com]
 Professor Boyles clearly recognizes a mis-use of the
 word "cause,".... "they can be exceptionally confusing
 to students on the linguistic level alone."
 .
 But he explained in several different ways in
 PHILCHEM_L why such a "mis-use" is justified in text
 books and in literature.
 .
 >> "good scientists are aware of these things"...
 >>"Empirical scientists work with many
 >>presuppositions and take many things
 >>for granted to simply 'get the job done,'".
 .
 Then, why are we a group of people who claim to be
 emerging philosophers of chemistry? What emerging for?
 Just follow experimentalists, "get the job done", make
 money, pound on the decades-long confusions, and make
 the confusions more and more solid? Are we willing to
 think "how philosophy is practised" uniquely?
 Further, it is a screaming sound to me that Shahbazian
 and Zahedi called for a "global convention"(!!!!!) in
 their conclusion of a 15 text page article in FOCH,
 although I absolutely have no idea what they want
 specifically. I guess, during a possible "global
 convention," some one is going to say something like:
 "we got to enjoy the beauty of mistakes (or mis-uses)
 created by our older generations. Please do not say
 that "the sp3 hybridization of the carbon atom in
 methane DOES NOT cause its tetrahedral geometry", as
 it is not language-economic by adding two more words
 "DOES NOT". A single word "cause" is much more
 convenient as the meaning of "cause" has never been
 vigorously defined and as there is no causal relation
 here.... "
 Please enjoy the "clear chemical language", a new
 emerging philosophy, and finally a funny international
 joke, my friends!
 Sengen
 > From:    "Boyles, David A." <David.Boyles^SDSMT.EDU>
 > Subject: Re: PHILCHEM Digest - 28 Aug 2006 to 31 Aug
 > 2006 (#2006-30)
 >
 > Sengen:
 >
 > In the statement "The sp3 hybridization of the
 > carbon atom in methane causes its tetrahedral
 > geometry" as cited, we find a mis-use of the word
 > "cause," and a prevalent one, at that, in textbooks,
 > not to mention for example which of Aristotle's four
 > causes are being invoked--if any.  Not presuming to
 > know with precision what Shahbazian and Zahedi
 > think, it is clear nonetheless that they are saying
 > that in a circular way we have two propositions--a
 > statement on hybridization, and a quite separate one
 > on geometry--which are referentially linked so as to
 > provide explanatory power.  These two statements
 > have become linked, even though historically their
 > origins are very separated in time.  What is
 > particularly interesting, perhaps, is that the most
 > recent proposition--hybridization theory--is used as
 > an explanatory cause of an earlier proposition, the
 > geometry of carbon (albeit with the caveat carbon in
 > some compounds only, and not all, although the
 > textbook statement does not sa!
 >  y as much).  Why this is the case and not the other
 > way around warrants its own scrutiny, but in any
 > case the impression is thus given of the
 > supervenience of earlier ideas which are apparently
 > obvious (geometrical objects) on later ideas which
 > are not at all overtly obvious (orbital theory), as
 > though the latter were the "cause" or perhaps more
 > correctly (?) the explanation of (?) or reason for
 > (?) the former.   I believe good scientists are
 > aware of these things, while others are unaware of
 > them, or at least unaware of the philosophical
 > issues engendered by them, including their
 > ontological and epistemological implications to our
 > understanding of phenomena themselves.
 >
 > These kinds of statements are typically found in
 > 'textbooks' which conflate separate ideas.
 > Evidently this has several purposes, including
 > economy of verbiage on one hand, and reinforcement
 > of related concepts in student minds on the other.
 > Far from intellectually rigorous, such level books
 > attempt with economy to present language statements
 > first and foremost as tools, as code-words which
 > students will hopefully realize are only that as
 > their academic careers develop.
 >
 > Apart from the scientifically utilitarian purpose
 > such statements might have on the 'textbook' level,
 > they can be exceptionally confusing to students on
 > the linguistic level alone.  I recall very vividly
 > how my undergraduate years foundered on puzzlement
 > not so much on the fact that there are many ideas
 > (propositions)in chemical space, but on the very
 > words used to relate one to another. Words such as
 > 'cause' which were never defined, but put into the
 > background 'created' much consternation to my own
 > learning experience.
 >
 > Far from trying to do the impossible and purge or
 > rework the language of textbooks, however, one would
 > do better to realize that textbooks are only
 > textbooks, and that for all the philosophical
 > problems present, that such problems are inherent in
 > any explanation, in any proposition, in any language
 > as philosophy is preeminently appreciated in making
 > us aware. Empirical scientists work with many
 > presuppositions and take many things for granted to
 > simply 'get the job done,' (including atomic theory
 > in my case--I weigh out compounds for my chemical
 > reactions in slavish subordination to the "count"
 > model of John Dalton whether or not it corresponds
 > to atoms makes little difference--a pianist must
 > likewise perform on something and in that case it
 > can by definition be but a keyboard of a piano)
 > presuppositions that require and deserve analysis in
 > philosophy. One begins to realize that after formal
 > education, perhaps, and not during it.  Formal
 > education is a slice of reality, a pl!
 >  atform of understanding, but not das Ding itself.
 >
 > Best Wishes,
 >
 > David A. Boyles
 > Professor of Chemistry
 > Department of Chemistry
 > South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
 > Rapid City, SD  57701
 >
 > From:    Ivan Antonowitz <binchem^MWEB.CO.ZA>
 > Subject: Re: Comments on A  Critique of Chemical
 > Language
 >
 > David A. Boyles posted:
 > >>
 > [snip]
 >  Not presuming to know with precision what
 > Shahbazian and Zahedi think, it
 > is clear nonetheless that they are saying that in a
 > circular way we have two
 > propositions--a statement on hybridization, and a
 > quite separate one on
 > geometry--which are referentially linked so as to
 > provide explanatory power.
 > These two statements have become linked, even though
 > historically their
 > origins are very separated in time.
 > [snip]
 > <<
 >
 > The keystone phrase in the above sentences is
 > "referentially linked". In the
 > Ordinary Language of Chemists, Philosophy and
 > Psychology are so
 > "referentially linked" as to be indistinguishable
 > from each other [thus
 > turning David's concept inside-out].
 >
 > Many are taken aback to find that few people Read
 > what the author Wrote.
 > Even if people agree on the same Denotations, their
 > Connotations can diverge
 > into incomprehensibility. On the other hand, unless
 > one is a post-modernist,
 > we conventionally agree that the word "Unicorn"
 > connotes a magical
 > horse-like creature with no Denotation; Unicorns do
 > not exist.
 >
 > The catch is that Connotations and Denotations are
 > only pre-1920
 > psychological concepts unique to human beings, and
 > as such are subject to
 > Formal Symbolic logic scrutiny to unravel their
 > muddled usages. In Formal
 > Symbolic logic we now instead distinguish Statements
 > from Propositions,
 > post-1980. Some systems still confuse the two as a
 > pedagogical short-cut
 > which is only unraveled much later on in the course.
 >
 > A further example of Dualism at work. In the
 > classroom, Teaching and
 > Learning are designed to be "referentially linked".
 > However, many on this
 > list would find it insulting to be 'taught a
 > lesson', but certainly expect
 > to learn from the other participants ideas. This
 > capability of 'unlinking'
 > is essential in any analysis.
 >
 > David could as well have used the historical
 > examples of electricity and
 > magnetism whose 'hidden unity' [J.C. Taylor]
 > involved just how information
 > was transmitted between them, despite their rather
 > divergent physical
 > characteristics. If David tried to espouse the
 > 'magnetic' approach, I have
 > tried to show the equivalent 'electric' shock.
 >
 > Ivan Anotonowitz
 >
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